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THE LAW OF BLOCKADE.
Classed with the most ancient and well ascertained operations
of war is the blockade. Sir Robert Phillimore, the eminent English
jurist, in his comprehensive work on International Law, (Vol. III,
page 473, 3rd ed.), observes that, "Among the rights of belligercnts
there is none more clear and incontrovertible, of more just and
necessary in the application, than that which gives rise to the law
of blockade." For this he .especially relies upon our own great
commentator, Chancellor Kent.
It is a curious fact that during the last half century, perhaps
since the Declaration of Paris of 1856, this right has played no
important part in the wars of Europe. She has had no great naval
wars. On the other hand. the blockade of the southern coast,
undertaken by the United States in its war with the Confederacy, was
the most extensive blockade known to history, and that of the ports
of Cuba and Porto Rico during the recent Spani.l-American war.
was an important and extensive operation of its kind.
In the Napoleonic wars. the Emperor Napoleon, by various
decrees, and the authorities of Great Britain by orders in ,council,
attempted on the one hand to impose the conditions of a blockade
by mere declaration, not accompanied by the presence of an ade-
quate force shutting off communication with the blockaded coast.
and on the other hand, to meet these declarations by severe and
unprecedented condemnations. These so-called "'paper" blockade:
were strongly disapproved, and finally, bv the Declaration of Paris
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of i856, most of the leading civilized nations of the world declared
that a blockade, to be obligatory, must be effective, that is to say,
"maintained by a sufficient force to shut out the access of the
enemy's ships, and other vessels," in reality. Thirty-eight states
acceded to this, but our own country was not among the number.
However, that declaration may be accepted as making an end to
the so-called "paper" blockades. (Lawrence's Wheaton, 2nd Ed.,
page 637, and notes.) And although the United States refused
to be a party to it, yet our Supreme Court (The tPeterhoif, 5 Wall.
28, at page 5o ) declared in i886:
"It must be premised that no paper or constructive
blockade is allowed by International Law. When such
blockades have been attempted by other nations, the United
States have ever protested against them and denied their
validity. Their illegality is now confessed on all hands.
It was solemnly proclaimed in the Declaration of Paris
of I856, to which most of the civilized nations of the
world have since adhered; and this principle is nowhere
more fully recognized than in our own country, though not
a party to that declaration."
Chief Justice Fuller, speaking for the court in The Olinde Rod-
rigues, 174 U. S. 5io, observes:
"This is now the settled doctrine of the English and
American courts and publicists, and it is embodied in the
second of the instructions issued by the Secretary of the
Navy, June 2o, 1898, General Order No. 492: 'A block-
ade to be effective and binding, must be maintained by a
force sufficient to render ingress to or egress from the port
dangerous.'"
A blockade declared but not maintained with adequate force
may operate, it seems, to modify the rights of shippers and the duties
of carriers, though not to give the right of capture and condemna-
tion. Thus in an action by Lechartier against La Compagnie Trans-
atlantique Francaise for non-delivery of goods shipped to Porto-
Plata (Hait), by which were not unshipped there on account of an
alleged blockade of the port, but were left at Port-au-Prince, the
"Tribunal de Commerce du Havre" decreed in 1889 that if a block-
ade had not been established in conformity with the convention of
Paris, that is to say, with adequate force, it is enough, that it has
been declared by one of the belligerents, to discharge a master,
charged with the unloading of the goods in the blockaded port, from
all responsibility for non-performance of his contract. He is equally
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exonerated when in accordance with the directions of the bill of
lading, he has deposited the goods in the port nearest to the block-
aded port. (Calvo, Le Droit International Th6orique et Pratique,
Tome 6, (Supplement G6n&al) Section 446; Journal du droit
international priv6, 1892, p. 183.
The right of a belligerent in time of war is to invest a port or
coast of the enemy, and to interdict all merchant vessels from ap-
proaching or dealing with the blockaded district. The vessels of
neutrals are affected, and this right of a belligerent is universally
admitted.
The leading principles, as announced in Phillimore (Vol. III,
page 495) are: "a-That where there has been a formal notifica-
tion of the blockade, a reasonable time must be allowed for it to
take effect. b-That where there has been no formal notification,
the knowledge of the party must be proved."
"That after a certain time it lies prima facie upon the party to
show that he was not apprised of the fact of the blockade."
In the first place, a blockade must be established by competent
authority. It may be by ministerial notice, or by an officer pursuant
to authority confided to him, or by a naval commander on a distant
station without express authority; but in the latter case, to affect
neutrals, this action must be ratified by the commander's govern-
nient. (Walker's International Law, page 520; The Rolla, 6 C.
Rol). 364.) Thus, as a recent example of a blockade proclaimed
by the government, we have that proclaimed by the United States
government with reference to the south coast of Cuba and San
Juan in Porto Rico, the proclamation for which is partially set out
in The Olinde Rodrigues, 174 U. S. 5xo; and as an example of a
blockade established by a naval officer, the blockade of
Guantanamo, declared by the late Admiral Sampson, which
was passed upon by the same great tribunal in The Adula,
176 U. S. 361, and was held to be within the power of a naval com-
mander. The court distinguishes " a simple or actual blockade,"
from "a public or presidential blockade," holding that the former
is "constituted merely by the fact of an investment, without any
necessity of a public notification." and that it ceases with the in-
vestment.
By custom the blockading belligerent in case of public blockade
issues formal notice to neutrals of the institution of the blockade.
This practice differs, but "according to the Anglo-American rule,
a public notification given by the belligerent to a neutral govern-
ment is ordinarily sufficient to convict all subjects of that govern-
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ment of the requisite guilty intent, provided that the statements
of the notice are fully borne out by the facts of the actual block-
ade." (Walker's International Law, page 520; Northcote v. Doug-
las, The Franciska, io Moore P. C. C. 59.)
In case of a blockade de facto by a naval commander without
special powers from his government, the existence of the blockade
must be brought to the knowledge of the blockade runner, and
warning must be given to vessels seeking to enter the forbidden
port. Even in case of blockade by proclamation, a reasonable
time must be given for the neutral government to advise its sub-
jects. Several of the continental countries of Europe assert a more
lenient rule than that adhered to by Great Britain and the United
States. Thus France, Italy, Spain and Sweden require direct and
individual notice of the blockade by one of the blockading squadron
to the neutral master before seizure. Such warning when given, is
endorsed on the ship's register. Prussia and Denmark follow the
Anglo-American practice. (Hall's International Law, page 698;
Walker's International Law, page 521.)
It was lately urgently contended, on the authority of a French
treatise on International Law by Pistoye and Duverdy, that since
the Declaration of Paris this Anglo-American doctrine had been
abandoned. But the Supreme Court (The Adula, 176 U. S. 361)
re-affirmed it in all its rigor, and there declared that "the opinions
of foreign writers on International Law cannot be accepted as
overruling in any particular prior decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States."
Mr. Walker (International Law, page 517) shows that "the
powers of the First Armed Neutrality required for the establish-
ment of a valid blockade of any port that the belligerents, 'by a
disposition of vessels, anchored and sufficiently near, make the at-
tempt to enter manifestly dangerous.'" That like provision was
made by the Neutral League of 18oo. In the Convention of i8oi,
Russia substituted the word "or" for "and,"' making it read,
"anchored or sufficiently near." The Declaration of Paris in 1856
declared that "blockades in order to be binding must be effective,
that is to say, maintained by force sufficient really to prevent access
to the coast of the enemy."
It is interesting to find that under this doctrine, which, as we
have seen, has been fully adopted by the civilized world and de-
clared by our own Supreme Court to be a part of International
Law, a blockade maintained by a single vessel has been held so
"effective," (see The Olinde Rodrigues, 174 U. S. 5IO), where the
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blockade of the port of San Juan in Porto Rico was held to be
complete and effective though one modem cruiser only was sta-
tioned before the port. The court considered the speed of the ves-
sel, the range of her guns, and her searchlight, and reached the
conclusion that her effective service in preventing entrance to the
port was greater than that of several cruisers of the old type, and
that the blockade must be held valid and complete. The court
however relies on two English cases which had already held that
under special circumstances a blockade might be effective though
maintained by but one vessel.
This is in strong contrast with the view of the majority of conti-
nental writers as to what constitutes an efficient blockade. These
views are summarized as follows: "The immediate entrance to a
port must be guarded by stationary vessels, in such number as
either to render entrance impossible, or at least to expose any ships
running in to a cross fire from the guns of two of them." (Hall's
International Law, p. 7o6, showing the rule as given by Calvo, Heff-
ter, Gessner, Ortolan, Hautefeuille, and Pistoye and Duverdy.)
A blockade having been once established is not discontinued
by the circumstance that stress of weather compels the blockading
squadron to temporarily withdraw. (III Phillimore, International
Law, page 484; Thc Columbia, i C. Rob. Adm. Rep. page 156.)
(And in commenting upon this, that learned writer points out that
on this and every other point of the law of blockade, the English
and the United States decisions are in perfect harmony.)
Nor is the blockade suspended if the guarding squadron is
drawn away for a reasonable distance in pursuit of a suspected
blockade runner. (Walker's Internatibnal Law, page 519.) In
186T. The Niagara, blockading Charleston, had been sent away
to intercept a cargo of arms expected at another part of the coast,
and the harbor was unguarded for at least five days. Lord Lyons
assumed that this was an interruption of the blockade, but the
United States in view of the effect of its general notification, refused
to admit that any cessation had occurred. (Wharton's Digest In-
ternational Law, Section 361: Hall's International Law, page 705.)
Walker expresses the belief. however, that Mr. Seward's contention
was "more in harmony with the spirit of the age of paper blockades
than with that of a period wherein blockades to be binding must
be effectively maintained." (Walker, International Law, page
519.)
The distance at which the blockading force is stationed seems
immaterial, so long as it commands the approaches of the invested
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port. "Thus Buenos Ayres has been considered to be effectually
blockaded by vessels stationed in the neighborhood of Monte Video;
and during the Russian War in 1854, the blockade of Riga was
maintained at a distance of one hundred and twenty miles from the
town by a ship in the Lyser Ort, a channel three miles wide, which
forms the only navigable entrance to the gulf." (Hall's Interna-
tional Law, page 7o4.)
The blockade must be uniform, and exclude all vessels not privi-
leged by law. As Vattel puts it, "Tout commerce est absolument
defindu avec une ville assi~ge6," (Vattel, L. III, c. VII, s. 117; III
Phillimore, p. 493.)
Where goods are carried to a neutral port with the ultimate pur-
pose of transporting them by land to a prohibited port, there is
no breach of blockade. This was held as to merchandise shipped
from London to Matamoras, Mexico, close to the borders of our
Confederate States, even though the goods were intended to be
supplied to the Texas market from Matamoras, so long as this
was not by sea. (The Peterhoff, 5 Wall. 28.) Nor if the goods are
carried to the blockaded port by inland canal does this constitute a
breach. (The Ocean, 3 C. Rob. 297.)
If some vessels are allowed to pass contrary to the rule of uni-
formity, others are warranted in treating the blockade as at an
end. (III Phillimore, p. 486.)
Where a blockade is commenced de facto by giving notice on
the spot to ships arriving from a distance, vessels seeking to enter
are entitled to notice before they are liable for the attempted breach.
But the vessels in the port are presumed to know the circumstances,
and are entitled to no such notice. Actual knowledge by the master
binds the ship, and it may be inferred from general notoriety of the
fact. (III Phillimore, p. 494.) And notice of a blockade to a char-
terer of the vessel who was on board was held notice to the vessel.
(The Adula, 176 U. S. 361.)
The legal presumption which arises from the vessel entering a
blockaded port is that it was for the purpose of delivering her
cargo. And this is not wholly rebutted though she depart without
such discharge. (III Phillimore, p. 496.)
If a ship approach a port blockaded de facto, for the purpose of
inquiry, this may be entirely justifiable. But she may not anchor
where she could easily break the blockade. Such an act raises a
presumption de jure of such an intent. If the blockade is not one
merely de facto, but is one by notification, such approach is wholly
unjustifiable. (III Phillimore, p. 497.) Enquiry by ships from a
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distance may, however, be justified. During the French war, Lord
Stowell so held as to American ships. But Phillimore points out
that with the improved means of rapid communication this principle
must be limited greatly. (III Phillimore, p. 498.) Such inquiry is
never held legal at the mouth of the blockaded waters, or if made
directly from the ships on guard. It should be made at ports on
the way where there is opportunity to get information, but where
there is no opportunity for fraud. (III Phillimore, p. 498; The
Betsey, i C. Rob. Adm. R. 334.) However, the innocence of the
suspected ship has sometimes been established under special facts,
even when the enquiry was at the very mouth of the forbidden port.
(III Phillimore, p. 499; The Little William, I Acton's Rep. 151.)
Phillimore mentions that a Dutch ordinance which Bynkershoek
approved, declared in 1630 that vessels bound to the blockaded
ports of Flanders were liable to confiscation, though found at a
distance from those ports, unless they had voluntarily altered the
voyage before coming in sight of the ports; that the English courts
hold that to sail for a blockaded port, knowing it to be such, is an
attempt at a breach, no matter what the distance, (The Cohmbia,
I C. Rob. Adm. Rep. 156): that, after doubting- this, the United
States Courts fully concurred in this in The Nereid, 9 Cranch 440,
holding further that if the ship, through stress of weather, were
driven into a different direction, yet her hostile intent remains. (III
Phillimore, p. 5O.) And Walker, page 524, affirms this as the
Anglo-American practice, although not the continental doctrine,
since that requires direct notice to each master from the blockading
vessels. The Anglo-American doctrine was very fully re-affirmed
in The Adula, 176 U. S. 361, in 1899, and it was intimated that
it would be adhered to by the Federal courts until it was modified
by Congress. The vessel is held liable from the moment she sails
with a premeditated intent to violate the blockade. This liability
continues, by the Anglo-American rule, during the entire voyage,
if the blockade continues so long. Many continental powers of
Europe holds otherwise, and that a blockade runner, upon her return
voyage, after she has escaped the pursuit of the blockading squad-
ron, is no longer liable for the breach. (Walker's International
Law, 526.)
There may be a breach of blockade by egress, and a ship coming
from a blockaded port may always be seized, and must clearly prove
her innocence. But egress is allowed in certain cases. A ship which
has entered before the blockade may retire in ballast. (The JlZo, 2
C. Rob. Adm. Rep. 119:III Phillimore. 503.) She may carry a cargo
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loaded before blockade, the goods being actually on the ship orlighter before the blockade. If the vessel is not stopped in heregress by the blockading squadron, but is later stopped bya vessel not on blockading duty, she has been discharged on thedouble grounds of defects of the blockade, and that the vesselstopping her had no such duty. (The Christina Margaretha, 6 C.Rob. Adm. Rep. 63; III Phillimore 504.)The proclamation announcing a blockade now commonly namesa certain time allowed ships in the interdicted ports for egress.Thus in the blockades in the war of the Crimea, France and Eng-land allowed fifteen days; and our own country allowed the same
-time in her blockade of the Confederate ports. However, in herblockade of the Cuban ports, she doubled the time, allowing thirtydays. (Hall's International Law, Section 262; Am. & Eng. Encyc.Law, 2nd ed. Vol. 16, p. 182.)
The cargo of a ship guilty of breach of blockade is subject to con-fiscation, as well as the ship, unless the cargo does not belongto the owner of the ship. In such latter case the cargo is notconfiscated unless the owner was, or ought to have been, apprisedof the blockade when he shipped the goods, or unless the act of the
master binds him. (III Phillimore 507.)An interesting and humane exception has been recently allowedby our own highest court in the case of fishing boats. (See ThePaquette Habana, The Lola, 175 U. S. 677.) After holding thatthe works of jurists and commentators on the subject of Interna-tional Law are resorted to by judicial tribunals not for the specu-lations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but fortrustworthy evidence of what the law really is, the majority of thecourt concludes that coast fishing vessels, with their implements,
appliances, cargoes and crews, when unarmed and honestly pursu-ing their peaceful calling of catching and bringing in fresh fish,and not employed for a warlike purpose, or in such way as to giveaid or information to the enemy, are exempt from capture as prizeof war, by the general consent of the civilized nations of theworld, and independently of any express treaty or other publicact; that prize courts administering the law of nations are bound totake notice judicially of and give effect to this rule. That a vessel ofthirty-five tons burden, with a crew of six men, with a catch of livefish amounting to about ten thousand pounds, is to be regarded asengaged in the coast fishery, and not in a commercial venture, andtherefore exempt within the above rule. The opinion is renderedby Mr. Justice Gray, and evidences his customary learning and re-
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search, exhausting the authorities upon the subject. Mr. Chief
Justice Fuller filed a brief dissenting opinion, in which Justices Har-
lan and McKenna concurred, but the array of authorities offered in
support of the dissent seems very slight and inconclusive as con-
trasted with that which supports the opinion of the court. The cases
arose in connection with the blockade of Havana which was the
port where these vessels sold their fish, but the decision is strictly
as to the law of prize and not of blockade.
Even after the period for the withdrawal of neutral private
vessels, at any time during the blockade, men-of-war of neutral
nations are, as a matter of courtesy, permitted to communicate with
the blockaded port, and to maintain a correspondence of their own or
other neutral powers, with their respective representatives. (Walk-
er's International Law, 523.) So Mr. Seward instructed Mr. Webb,
our minister to Brazil in 1868, that the United States was entitled
under the law of nations to send without molestation from the Bra-
zilian blockading squadron, an armed cruiser up the river Parana to
Paraguay, then at war with Brazil, the object being to bring home
the minister of the United States at Paraguay, (3 Wharton's Digest
International Law, Section 361) ; and Mr. Seward'notified the rep-
resentative of Prussia in i86I with reference to the blockade of the
southern ports, "That armed vessels of neutral states will have the
right to enter and depart from the interdicted ports." (3 Wharton's
Digest International Law, Sec. 361.) This right must not be the
cover of any illegitimate dealings. In 1863, Mr. M'Gee, the acting
British consul at MNobile. placed on H. M. ship Vesuvius a large
amount of money, the property of the State of Alabama. to be con-
veyed to Havana, and thence to London for the payment there of
interest due from the State on her bonds to British holders. For
this irregularity, Mr. Mi'Gee was dismissed from the British service,
and Lord Lyons was directed to apologize to the United States for
the conduct of a British civil servant at variance with the duties of
an agent of a neutral power. (Walker's International Law, 523;
Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, 1863, p. 460.)
The right of foreign ships of war, as above indicated, is permissive,
and cannot be claimed absolutely.
Entry into the interdicted port under circumstances of unavoid-
able necessity will be excused, but in the case of merchantmen it is
closely scrutinized. (Walker's International Law, p. 523.)
The older writers approved of the corporal punishment of the
blockade runner. (Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pacis, Vol. 3, Ch. i,
Sec. V; Vattel, Vol. 3, P. 717; Walker's International Law, p. 525.)
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The passage from Grotius relied on by Walker seems the following
in the paraphrase of Dr. Whewell: "When the Romans carried
provisions to the enemies of the Carthagenians, they were some-
times taken prisoners by the Carthagenians, and then given up by
the Carthagenians to the Romans being demanded. When Deme-
trius held Attica, with an army, and had taken Eleusis and Rham-
nus neighboring towns, intending to reduce Athens by famine, and
when a ship attempted to introduce corn into the city he hung the
captain and the pilot of the ship, and thus deterring others, became
master of the city." This is now wholly obsolete, and a confisca-
tion of the ship, and by the rule of infection, of any cargo belong-
ing to the ship owner, and of any portion of the cargo belonging
to an owner cognizant of the blockade, or who makes the master
his agent, is the sole punishment. (Walker's International Law,
p. 525.)
It has been decided that a violation of blockade is not an offense
against the municipal laws of England. (III Phillimore, p. 515;
The Helen, L. R. i Adm. & Eccl. i; Ex parte Chavasse re Graze-
brook, ii Jurist, N. S. 400.)
The recent blockade of the ports of Venezuela by the naval
forces of Great Britain and Germany was at first assumed an in-
stance of a pacific blockade. Later incidents in the investment of
those ports certainly made the blockade a warlike one, and Mr.
Balfour, prime minister of Great Britain, admitted in the House
of Commons at an early date that a state of war existed. That a
blockade may be pacific seems to be admitted. One of the most
complete discussions of pacific blockade is found in Hall on Inter-
national Law, 3rd ed. Sec. 121. He points out that there is a lia-
bility of strong powers to exercise this right against weak powers,
but that it must not be forgotten that weak countries sometimes
presume upon their weakness, and that the possibility of taking
measures against them less severe than war may be as much to
their advantage as to that of the injured powers. He collects, in a
learned note, the opinions of many publicists favoring such block-
ades, provided the property of third powers is not affected, and
he gives the Declaration of the Institut de Droit International,
adopted in 1887, limiting its application and maintenance. He
points out that in the nineteenth century such blockades were not
infrequent. The first occurred in 1827, when the coast of Grieece
was blockaded by England, France and Russia, although these
three nations professed still to be at peace with Turkey. The Tagus
was blockaded by France in 1831; New Grenada by England in
34-0
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1836; Mexico by France in 1838; La Plata by France in I838-4o,
and by France and England from 1845 to 1848, and the Greek ports
by England in I85o. That subsequently to the last date there was
no fresh instance until 1884, when France blockaded a part of the
coast of Formosa, and finally, in 1886, Greece was blockaded by
Great Britain, Austria, Germany, Italy and Russia. (See Hall's
International Law, p. 369, 3rd ed.; Rivier's Cours de Droit de Gens,
p. 152.) Hall shows that these blockades have been variously con-
ducted. In some cases ships of the blockaded power and of third
powers were alike brought in for condemnation, as in the blockade
of Mexico. In others all ships were sequestered, to be restored at
the termination of the blockade. In the later blockades of this
character, ships of the blockaded power only were sequestered.
Under the French blockade of Formosa, the right to capture neu-
tral vessels and to condemn them was claimed, but it was denied
by Lord Granville.
The position of England seems to have been misunderstood.
and M. F. de Martens in his Trait de Droit Int. iii. 174, makes the
extraordinary allegation that England confiscates the vessels not
only of the blockaded power, but of neutrals as well. Hall says,
"The statement is totally destitute of foundation." (Hall's Interna-
tional Law, Section 21.)
Discussing the blockade of the Venezuelan ports, Professor
Theodore S. Woolsey, in the Independent for December 18, 1902,
while pronouncing the blockade pacific, says that a pacific blockade
is a contradiction in terms. "Blockade is a war measure." He
shows that if it is pacific it can apply only to Venezuelan commerce,
and not to that of neutral powers. So Rivier lays down the rule as
to "Blocus pacifique": "Les navires de pavilion itranger peuvent
entrer libre-ient inalgr le blocus." (Cours de Droit Des Gcns, p.
152.)
It will be observed that a formal notice of this blockade was
issued, to begin upon a day certain, but with a liberal allowance
of days of grace for vessels already at sea. American vessels de-
tained by the allied ships, as appears by newspaper report, have al-
ready made complaint to Secretary Hay for illegal interference by
the blockading cruisers.
In conclusion it may be observed that the complete harmony of
Great Britain and the United States in all decisions concerning the
law of blockade, together with the widely extended possessions
of those powers. their large participation in maritime trade, and
their important position as naval powers, tend to make the Anglo-
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Amercan practice predominate in this branch of International Law.
That this tendency is perhaps strengthened by the fact that, as we
have seen, the greatest blockade known to history was maintained
by our country as against the Confederacy and that by far the
most important blockade since then was the blockade maintained
by our country during the Spanish war.
The experience of the Civil War seemed to prove that steam was
a more efficient agency for the evasion of blockades than for their
maintenance, and that it was therefore "unwise to shackle the bel-
ligerents with too severe restrictions." (Hall's International Law,
Section 26o.)
The decisions arising from the Spanish war, while re-affirming
many well establised rules, are notable particularly for the refusal
of our court to modify our rules as to blockade in accordance with
those stated by continental writers on International Law. (See
The Adula, 176 U. S. 361.) For the re-affirmation of the Anglo-
American rule that a ship sailing with intent to violate a blockade
is subject to capture from the moment she leaves port, see The
Adula, supra.
For the decision to the effect that a blockade may be maintained
by a single armed cruiser, where her powers and equipment are ade-
quate to effectively protect the entrance to the blockaded harbor,
see The Olinde Rodrigues, 174 U. S. 51o. This is not wholly new,
but the discussion as considering the power of a modem cruiser is
highly interesting.
For the enlightened and humane decision, that coast fishing ves-
sels, with their supplies and crews, when unarmed and honestly pur-
suing their peaceful calling, are exempt from capture, according
to the rules of International Law, see The Paquette Habana, The
Lola, 175 U. S. 677. It is believed also that these decisions display
a disposition to somewhat modify the harsher rules of war, and to
give a liberal interpretation both to facts and rules of law for the
protection of commerce, as in holding that the forfeiture of a vessel
for attempting to run a blockade should not be made on evidence
consisting of suspicious circumstances merely. (The Newfound-
land, 176 U. S. 97; and see The Buena Ventura v. U. S., 175 U. S.
384.) This enlightened tendency of our highest courts will be wel-
,omed by all students of International Law, which is so essentially
pacific and which from the time of Grotius has so steadily and
nobly modified the asperities of war.
It is too early to say what decisions may be rendered necessary
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by the course pursued by Great Britain and Germany upon the
coast of Venezuela. It is hoped that all difficulties there are now
in the way of peaceful adjustment. The right of blockade, which
Phillimore called "one of the simplest and most universal opera-
tions of war in all ages and civilized countries," has certainly for
two generations found greater exemplification in the practice and
judicial decisions of our peace loving Republic than in those of any
other country, and therefore it has seemed of interest to submit this
brief statement of the general principles and practices governing
the exercise of the right with especial mention of the modifications
arising from our late war with Spain.
Charles Noble Gregory.
Dean's Office, College of Law, State University of Iowa.
